OLD ORDER, NEW CHALLENGES

INTERSTATE

ABOUT INTERSTATE

Interstate Journal of International Affairs is an exclusively undergraduate-run academic journal, organised under the auspices of Aberystwyth University's prestigious Department of International Politics. It focuses on issues of international and current affairs, and it aims to allow students an opportunity to comment on and analyse world affairs in depth alongside contributions by academics and practitioners in the field. Its contributions have also been republished internationally.

Interstate provides a space in which students can apply their new skills and pursue their academic interests, while achieving tangible results on paper and online. Our writers and editors work without the pressure of marking, but with the support and critical input of their peers, and the professional oversight of the Department. If you are a student of either the Department of International Politics or Aberystwyth University and would like to join Interstate's editorial team, please e-mail interstate1965@gmail.com or interstate@aber.ac.uk

A NOTE FROM EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

Welcome to the Interstate Journal of International Politics, I would like to welcome all our readers to our spring issue. It is a pleasure to be Editor-in-Chief of such a wonderful journal, so full of creative ideas and fresh perspectives on a world that is constantly changing. I would like to thank all the editorial staff, design team and contributors to the journal for coming together to create our first issue after two years of absence. This issue would not have been possible without their work and time that they have put into this issue. It has been a challenging few months for this issue to come together as the editorial staff has been dealing with course deadlines and other issues that come to the fore as they often do as students. However, this issue represents the wide range of issues that face our modern society in the world of international politics, and I hope you enjoy reading them as much as I have enjoyed editing this journal.

A NOTE FROM EDITORIAL TEAM

When the Interstate Journal was last published back in late 2019, the world was just discovering the covid-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine had not yet broken out, and we were on the verge of a new era of Arab Israeli relations under the US's President Trump. Since then, we have observed the return of land war in Europe, the expulsion of people from Nagorno-Karabakh, renewed threats in the south China sea, a break down in the primary forces of globalisation of supply chains, and the brutal return of war in the near east. As we all face the theoretical and very real-world challenges of our modern times, the Interstate team is honored to welcome both readers and students to this newly published issue of the Interstate Journal. As we bring a selection of articles across the vast spectrum of international relations, from climate change to language, from Gaza to London, from global leadership to naval doctrine, we sincerely hope readers enjoy this issue.

INDEXES

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

1.
Language

In this fascinating article, titled "Lost in Translation", Candela Ortega, an undergraduate student of Aberystwyth University, critically discusses the implication of the uni-lingual IR discipline, currently dominated by English-speaking scholars.

Lost in Translation

CANDELA ORTEGA

"And he said, Who gave you the knowledge that you were without clothing? Have you taken of the fruit of the tree which I said you were not to take? And the man said, The woman whom you gave to be with me, she gave me the fruit of the tree and I took it".[1]

Dear reader,

I do not know you, and yet I am probably right in assuming you are somehow familiar with this passage. It belongs to a renewed translation of the Bible. In it, the notorious story of Adam and Eve is told. However, do you notice any elements missing from it? Have you realised how there is no reference to the famous apple?

In Latin, the word "malum" refers to evil, while "malus" means apple. The evident similarity between these two terms, mixed with the context of this passage (the Garden of Eden), made

translators like St Jerome, the writer of the first Latin Bible, *Vulgata*, believe that the Forbidden Fruit was an apple for many centuries. Nonetheless, as more recent translations reveal, the term employed by the authors of the Bible was actually something more along the lines of "evil".

There was never an apple. Or maybe there was, only it was not specified. Anyhow, this erroneous metaphor has shaped Christian-based cultures for centuries: In art, apples can almost immediately be interpreted as a symbol of sin and passion. Christmas trees are decorated with red ornaments imitating the inexistent fruit

all over the world, and so on.

This incident might seem irrelevant to some of you in relation to IP. Nevertheless, it highlights quite clearly the importance of a good translation, and how the information we have access to can shape our understanding of reality. In fact, this event is actually a reflection of how the establishment of a specific language as the "standard language" in a discipline can be detrimental to the quality of the information gathered, transmitted and acquired globally by its scholars.

It could be contended that, with the avoidance of wrong translations like St Jerome's, the establishment of English as the "standard language" in IP would not necessarily stain the information in this discipline. Thus, out of curiosity, and as an experiment to prove my thesis for this article, I asked some international students currently in Aberystwyth about words or expressions that they feel cannot really be translated from their mother tongues to English. Here are just a few of them that stuck out the most to me:

"얼큰하다" in Korean could easily be mistaken for "spicy", when it actually refers to a type of spicy that entails some

sense of refreshness and detoxification. In Norwegian, the word "fysen" would typically translate to "craving" in English, when in fact it stands for that feeling of craving something but not knowing what that something is. Furthermore, in Welsh, the term "cwtch" not only describes a "cuddle", but rather what Welsh-speaking students can only explain as "a more secure and safe kind of hug".

It is those small nuances that cannot be conveyed from one language to the other that we lose with the establishment of a specific language as the "standard language" in IP. And although words like "spicy", "hug" or "craving" might be a close enough translation for us, there are millions of pieces of information about other people that, as we read IP theory in English, get lost in translation. This way, with or without mistakes like St Jerome's, every translation is always partially incomplete.

Still, surely the establishment of a language as "the standard language" in a discipline could be seen as necessary in order to ensure the contribution of scholars internationally to the theory behind it. Moreover, some might argue the alternative

practices like dual-language books or more detailed translations to be a needless effort. However, this argument is easily disproved with the success of formats such as bilingual textbooks or translation commentaries amongst the international community in other humanitarian academic disciplines. I believe this phenomena is proof that the establishment of language barriers in the discipline of IP is more than a careless and practical decision.

In *The Love of the Nightingale*, the playwright Timberlake Wertenbaker reflects, amongst other things, on the conscientious silencing of certain voices through the establishment of a language barrier:

"**Tereus**: You should have kept quiet.

Pause.

I did what I had to.

Pause.

You threatened the order of my rule.

Pause.

How could I allow a rebellion? I had to

keep you quiet".[2]

In Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, Philomele's tongue is cut off by Tereus, her own rapist, in order to ensure her silence.[3] Equally, Wertenbaker's Philomele suffers the same fate, although in this play, the act can be interpreted as a visceral representation of the exclusion of certain perspectives from political discussions held internationally.

According to Wertenbaker's metaphor, it is almost a tradition for some voices to be classified as unworthy of being heard, for instance, those who are found "non-contributing" to progress. Others are silenced because, like Philomele's experience in relation to Tereus, they threaten the order of the rule of other personas in the international scene, for example, by shining a light on elements that undermine their actions, power or arguments. Following Tereus' example, these agents might choose to solve their apprehension by exercising quiet violence.

Now, I am aware I am supposed to offer a possible solution to this problem as a pretty and put-together conclusion to this article for the reader to feel satisfied with having

chosen to read it in the first place. Still, as you might have probably guessed by now, I do not intend to do so. In this article, I purposefully choose not to follow the standard format that has been established for article writing and that I have been taught my whole life. It simply does not benefit me, as my intention with this piece of writing is not to please anyone, not even you.

Instead, I aim to leave you reflecting on how we have accepted a standard type of IP theory without a question. The issues of how the establishment of a language or format as the correct and exclusive way to write in limits the information a piece of writing holds, or how it is also a way for those who benefit from the international system's idiosyncrasy to ensure they never lose those benefits have failed, in my opinion, to be discussed in the IP community of Aberystwyth. So hopefully you will find this conclusion insufficient enough to keep thinking about this matter on your own.

2.
Migrants

Readers now move on to the subject of climate change. In this article, Koralage approaches the overtly exhausted topic from a renewed perspective: migrants. Titled "Migrants Contributions and Climate Justice" the paper calls for stronger international accountability.

Migrant Contributions and Climate Justice: A call for international accountability in the face of rising climate migration

KIVIDI KORALAGE

In climate vulnerable nations like Haiti, Honduras, and Nepal remittances from international migrants contribute over 20% of GDP; supporting livelihood diversification, resilience and poverty reduction. These remittances are vital during natural disasters, aiding their families and investing in important projects such as healthcare and reconstruction. Furthermore, migrants are often actively involved in climate adaptation projects in their native country such as access to renewable energy.[1] This highlights the importance of international migrants in funding a sustainable recovery from natural disasters.

The UNDP works with migrant organisations in Senegal, where migrants are involved in improving the quality of life to mitigate emigration drivers; and in Uzbekistan, where the migrants assist in restoring ecological environment such as forests to combat climate change.

The significant impact the migrants contribute are one step of the global South to launch their vision to a sustainable economy. However, despite this, the role of international migrants in sustaining the 1.5°C. Paris Agreement target was not discussed at COP28.[2]

When addressing the question why climate migration is on rise, the simple answer is the failure prevent the rise in global temperatures from greenhouse

gas emissions. This form of migration is triggered when people are displaced by natural disasters, including floods, heatwaves, droughts, and wildfires; in addition to slower moving challenges such as melting of ice glaciers and sea levels rises causing distress in the Pacific islands. Latin America, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa are regions which are most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and resulting emigration, with predictions of rising cross-border migrations. The World Bank predicts these regions will produce 143 million internal climate migrants by 2050.[3]

In terms of justice climate migrants have basic rights as per international human rights law. Nonetheless, advocates believe that these migrants lack many important protections which are afforded to refugees. The 1951 UN refugee convention, created to regulate refugees from the Second World War, as well its expansions; have established the principal rights of refugees. However, in the contemporary world, unlike refugees, migrants fleeing climate disaster states are not protected under international law. Climate migrants are not legally classified as refugees and there are no separate treaties governing their rights.[4]

Nearly 60 percent of the world's displaced are living in countries which are most vulnerable to climate change.[5] These are refugees fleeing conflict and persecution that are now vulnerable to further displacement from the effects of climate change. A comprehensive legal framework to protect people displaced by climate crises is vital to ensure they are guaranteed fundamental rights. We can observe an upward trend where 1.2 billion people could be displaced by 2050 due to climate crisis.[6]

The universal human rights treaties do not include the right to a safe and healthy environment and under the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child states the significance and the right of clean food and clean water taking into consideration of danger and risk of environmental pollution. However, the conventions are difficult to implement. In addition, the 1998 UN Guiding Principle on Internal Displacement provides the adequate framework to protect the victims affected from natural disaster who do not cross international borders and in 2009 the Council of Europe suggested creating a guiding framework for the protection of displaced persons crossing international

borders due to natural disasters. This inspired the African Union's Kampala Convention which adopted this framework. This extends protection to persons not covered under the 1951 convention and 1967 protocol for those at risk of being returned, under human rights grounds.[7]

Finally, the office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights studied the effects of climate change on human rights and found three key issues to be explored before considering climate as causing violation of human rights. Firstly, it should be proven that one country's greenhouse gas emissions cause a specific effect on another country. Secondly, it should be proven unequivocally that humans are responsible for most of the increase in global temperatures. Finally the human rights framework should be reconsidered as a tool used in response to the violation, whilst climate change regulations are only concerned with potential future harm.[8]

Although these conventions and COP28 are successful in certain areas. No justice has been served to the victims of climate change. The international community should ensure justice is served to the victims of climate change, because the right to live in a safe environment and the right to access clean water and food is a common right of any civilian. It is important for the countries who are the largest greenhouse gas emitters such as China to be more accountable for their actions and aid the climate displaced people.

3
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Leadership

In this long-piece article, Arthur Wacker, a
second-year undergraduate student and an
editor of the Interstate Journal, contemplates
the future of global leadership in an increasingly
multipolarizing world.

The Past, Present, and Future of Global Leadership: Governance in a Multipolar World

ARTHUR WACKER

Within International Relations, the idea of global "leadership" holds a prominent role across contemporary global affairs yet can express itself in multi-faceted forms. The rise of nation-states since the French Revolution and the decline of imperial warfare across the world in later centuries saw the international economy being elevated to more collaborative, developmental, and competitive levels, particularly when modern conceptions of economics and politics became interwoven as a result of state socialisation and globalisation in the 20th Century, and the process of decolonisation saw the emergence of a 'developing' world.

Today, we see the development of the liberal global economy holding responsibility in the hands of powerful economic actors supposedly acting upon a humanist ethos to ensure the stability and prosperity of the global community. These responsibilities are no longer limited to purely the nation-state but newly formed non-state actors that transcend purely national and international powers. At the dawn of the unipolar world order after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, it was evident that America rose to the helm in regard to "leading" the global political economy.

In analysing America's responsibility and accountability as a leader – including its efforts in coordination with non-state

actors – I shall argue that this leadership to govern all the phenomenological factors in contemporary international relations has largely failed. However, this order of the international system is radically changing in the face of newly emergent economic powers. Thus, the reshaping of the international order, breaking the outmoded framework of American unipolarity and unilateralism, is arising.

This essay shall look to evaluate both the history and phenomena of leadership and polarity across contemporary international relations. I shall argue that the importance of international leadership as a shared approach between major state actors' economies is presupposed by the structure of the evolving international landscape and is, therefore, the only possibility for the future of international leadership. The unilateral approach of the United States contradicts the existence of several established major economies in the international system; it also undermines the significant leadership roles they constitute and their responsible relationships to developing economies.

To enforce this argument, I shall look to the unilateralism of the United States to demonstrate the drawbacks of

an international system in which a sole major economy embodies the leadership role through a unipolar order. In the first section, I will argue why the modern (post-1991) international neo-liberal economy theoretically presupposes the conditions for an international system in which leadership is naturally shared by the major economies.

In the second section, I will argue that the unipolar position that the United States of America has taken within modern history is a formula of leadership that is now outmoded, legitimising leeway for a new system in which the foundations for shared leadership of the modern global political economy can be exercised.

Finally, to argue for the alternative system, in which the future involves international leadership shared among major economies, I shall explore the newly emergent political economy led by China and argue that China's approach to economic leadership and cooperation opens a new future for a balancing of major economies globally.

To begin, if the modern political economy is to be understood as the manifestation of 'low politics' and 'high politics' with

the globalisation of liberalism following 1991, then leadership within International Relations encompasses how states embody leadership roles within this system.[1] Although national and international economic concerns arguably became political far before 1991 within the 20th Century (particularly around the post-World War I order with the introduction of state-managed socialisation efforts), the way in which the global political economy would be framed in 1991 arguably – from the Western unipolar, Western-centric perspective - saw a worldwide shift to one particular political-economic approach: liberalism.[2]

Liberalism saw both 'high' and 'low' politics as equally important: to ensure the survival of a state ('high politics'), economic stability and development (previously 'low politics') were, after 1991, now essential to empower it. [3] States worldwide outside of the West understood they needed to participate in the global political economy to ensure survival, but importantly, they had to rely on the already-established major economies (that had operated in this system for decades prior) to do so: this interdependence meant that the superior major economies

following a liberal doctrine (such as the G7) had a responsibility to ensure the survival and security of these participating states. [4]

If the major economies in the liberal system assert that the participation for lesser-developed economies in the neo-liberal market is essential to their own survival, they therefore need to hold accountability and responsibility for that process due to their role in complex interdependence.[5] Leadership is necessitated through this political-economic responsibility – it must be shared among them: they are inherently responsible for global development between themselves and lesser-developed economies.[6] The political concept of an 'international system', therefore, entails a political economy in which polities engage in economic relations to uplift themselves and through the existence of the market, uplift others (an exchange-based competitive system).[7]

Then, if international regimes are constructed to benefit all participating states worldwide, then conflict is avoided, at least in theory. Such a procedure is exercised diplomatically, considering multiple state interests, which is namely

a multilateral approach. The way in which this liberal order has been established, it is only feasible that the only possible future of global political economy is of a system in which the major economies hold shared positions of leadership. However, although multiple major economies exist, they are not equal: the United States' leadership strongly dominates as a unipolar leader dominant over other existing major economies.[8]

I thus now shall focus on the United States' unipolar leadership in the international economy. The modern conception of political-economic multilateralism emerged as an arrangement of international economic leadership during the global economic order that emerged after 1945, as a practice freshly established by inter-governmental organisations. What is often ignored, however, is that arguably, many of these multilateral institutions have always relayed themselves at the behest of the U.S.'s interests, beholden to and coordinated by a global economic model resting on the U.S. dollar through the World Bank, the Bretton-Woods System and thereafter.[9]

It may be argued that these organisations still worked to involve multiple participating state actors within diplomatic economic relations even if they were deemed coercive toward an Americanised hegemony, but although the United States had a major influence in establishing these multilateral organisations, state unilateralism was still a habitual practice of the leading major economy.[10] Of course, diplomatically, the American state has acted multilaterally in many a-cases, but the degree in which it has exercised its leadership unilaterally is far more apparent. [11] This is because the Fukuyaman "victory" of the liberal global economy inherently established the United States and its ideological prominence as an economic hegemony, and the United States has since ensured to maintain that role of inherent economic leadership.[12] It is generally agreed that the role of responsibility the United States plays as the major economic leader internationally is so potent, that there are "few, if any, global issues that can be addressed or resolved without U.S. support and cooperation."[13]

However, the U.S.'s assumed responsibility as the hegemonic leader hasn't remained loyal to the theoretical role of responsibility a major economic leader should be expected to uphold within the

liberal international system. Withdrawing from modern multilateral arrangements when it chooses and pursuing its sole ideological path, the U.S. has often pursued a leadership role that stands irrespective of other states' economic interests worldwide, particularly in the Global South.[14]

A prominent example has been demonstrated throughout the War on Terror and other humanitarian intervention efforts, all of which arguably resulted in negative outcomes for international economic diplomacy.[15] Arguably, the social motives of humanitarian interventionism (security and democracy for states worldwide) dating back to the 'Truman doctrine' contradict economic motives regarding American leadership.[16] The invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as intervention in Libya were largely unilateral as the U.S. engaged these efforts by its sole accord, leading the conflicts in disregard for any other state interests. [17]

Economically, there was a clear duality of interests with the liberal humanitarianism and the oil industry's interests in claiming Iraqi and Afghan oil sources – with similar conflicting interests in the U.S.-backed overthrowing of a traditionally economic

dissident, Muammar Gaddafi: the oil industry's motives did not seek to benefit the international community like the humanitarian doctrine sought out to do – rather, they only sought to benefit solely the U.S. [18]   Many academics argue that ultimately, a primary motive for this War on Terror was of an economic one.[19]

This unilateral leadership's execution of both militant invasion and regime change created deeply complex and devastating conflict in the Middle East, most noticeably with the rise of ISIS (leading to increased military spending and conflict), the ongoing civil war in Libya leading to complete economic crisis and civil war, and the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan immediately following U.S. troop withdrawal, showcasing the creation of what the West perceives to be an economically-dissident state. [20] America's unilateralism was not welcome in the Middle East, and caused negative economic consequences that outweighed any humanitarian efforts.[21]

Another example to demonstrate the negative consequences of American unilateralism comes in America's efforts to squash political economies it deems as dissident and nonconforming to its

hegemony.[22] For example, American-imposed sanctions on Cuba have warranted vehement opposition from most UN states, and yet the United States have not lifted the sanctions or embargo, showing a lack of regard for multilateral consideration.[23] The fact that the Cuban economy – and many other countries sanctioned unilaterally by the United States – have only suffered from these economic impositions, provides two takeaways.

First of all, the hegemonic unilateralist leadership that the U.S. plays in the international system is irrespective towards dissident political economies, showing a disregard for responsibility in mutual development of economies regardless of political differences. Secondly, that the resentment that grows across multilateral institutions (such as the UN) shows that the majoritarian position in the international system is oppositional toward unilateral economic pursuits.

Conclusively, American unilateral leadership in the international economic system is not morally justified nor legitimised. With persistent anti-diplomatic violence toward states in the Middle-East, and sanctions being imposed

on nations in the Global South irrespective of the interests of multilateral inter-governmental states, the U.S. promoted itself as a self-serving economic leader. Therefore, it can be argued that the unipolarity of the United States in the global political economy as the sole leader of the international system is not sustainable in the long-run and is not considered a possibility for the future of effective exercise in international leadership.

Finally, as the modern international system evolves, the hegemonic nature of a world dominated by one major economy as a leader is being contested by the rise of major economic powers that do not align themselves with the liberal world order.[24] Although the G20, for example, aims at a multilateral grouping of major economic powers, several of them, most notably China, are proposing alternative models to the liberal global economy.[25]

Ergo, although inter-governmental institutions are advocating multilateral forms of leadership, and these newly emergent economic powers are willing to participate economically through this system, they also seek multilateral forms of leadership from the U.S. itself. [26]

Major economies are also influential enough to now act multilaterally outside the confines of liberal inter-governmental institutions: The Belt-and-Road Initiative, for example, demonstrates China's role as a major economic power becoming an international leader by establishing a global infrastructure development strategy outside the conventions of the liberal economic apparatus.[27]

Rather than working through established liberal multilateral institutions to focus on the development of economies, separate from the intertwining of the U.S. dollar, China seeks to engage in an inclusive development strategy via its own accord as a state, developing its own multilateral state network.[28] Rather than exercising such a strategy to solely benefit itself, co-operating states mutually benefit through a multilateral trade model. Secondly, this strategy does not interfere with the leadership of the other major economic powers such as the United States, insofar as it seeks co-operation rather than domination.[29]

By analysing China's quantitatively and qualitatively different socialist-market economy to the neo-liberal economic model,

China's approach to the international system as a major economy positions itself as polar leader.[30] Rather than inhibiting different political-economic systems through unilateral trade sanctions (such as that of the U.S.), China's BRI promotes the diversity of political-economies worldwide, uninterested in political-economic differences, and helps them grow mutually according to both parties' interests.[31] As the U.S. is still a competitor to China – and often oppositional to China's economic leadership – it deems reasonable that for future relations to be diplomatic and free from conflict within the international system, there needs to be a sharing of leadership between these major economic powers, as China is not expected to step-down as an economic leader nor submit to the liberal international currency exchange.

Perhaps, with positive outlook for the BRI strategy, this newly formulated international economic system can lead to positive consequences across the international economy, particularly the Global South. It is also evident, with the BRICS embracing new membership, and with the emergence of major economies that seek greater distance from the American-

dominated economy, that for stability to be ensured at the very least, the rise of China and a new order of polarities give credence to the argument that the only possible future for the international system is one in which shared leadership between major economies is respected and ascertained. From the empirical shift from a unipolar international system to a multipolar system, as evidenced by the rise of this different but prominent political economy, it is evident that a multilateral approach to the international system– where the U.S. stands as one of many major economic leaders, rather than a sole leader – is being further facilitated and necessitated. In this regard, this multi-polar organisation of leadership is inevitable, and thus, the only possible future.

In conclusion, I have established both theoretical and empirical reasoning for why the international system supports a multi-polar order in which leadership is shared between major economic powers. Theoretically, the importance of liberal economics transitioning from 'low' into 'high' politics during the dawn of the modern political economy presupposes the need for major economies to collaborate with each other and lesser-developed economies for mutual survival and development. Empirically, the U.S., inherently positioning itself as the liberal hegemon, has failed to embody the responsibility required of such a position.

With the growth of new major economies such as the BRICS+ and the G20, helmed by China as an economic leader distinct from the American-led liberal economic system, it is empirically clear that the future of the international system will feature multiple economic leaders as it continues to switch from unipolarity to multipolarity. By aligning itself with this empirical phenomenon, rather than sticking by the attitude which stems from traditionally considering major economics such as China an obstacle to its own stability, the American multilateralist approach seems to be more reasonable in not approaching the U.S. as now one of many major economic leaders, completing the theoretical justification for shared economic leadership in the international system.

4
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Climate

This is another short article on climate change. This time, the eyes are turned to Japan, as the author calls for the Japanese government to be at the forefront of worldwide and Southeast Asian sustainable developments.

Holding Japan Accountable:
How a Leading Nation is Lagging Behind

TIERNEY TRANT

The magnitude 7.6 earthquake that struck Japan on New Year's Day served as a powerful reminder of "climate chaos" and its implications for the country. Japan particularly faces vulnerability with its unique topography as an island nation, prone to disasters such as typhoons, landslides, and torrential rain. Climate-linked geological changes are becoming all the more common, and Japan is no exception to this threat. As sea levels rise, natural disasters are expected to worsen as their frequency, duration, and severity are exacerbated. Despite the imposed risk of climate change, Japan continually faces criticism for its lack of initiative in the transition towards renewable energy.

For the fourth consecutive year, Japan was "awarded" two dishonourable "Fossil Awards" during the United Nations Climate Conference (COP28) for its reluctance to embrace renewable energies. Japan stands as a major global power with the world's fourth largest economy yet ranks lowest out of any G7 country for its dependence on renewable energy. At the same time, Japan is the world's fifth largest consumer of energy with a self-sufficiency rate of only 11%, relying on imports to meet 97% of its energy demand.

The Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry defends the nation's shortcomings by claiming difficulties in expanding renewables due to Japan's

diverse terrain. Mountainous landscapes, steep shorelines, and dense populations may prevent Japan from ramping up renewable energy production. Researchers have been quick to dispute these assertions, stating that Japan has vast domestic solar and wind energy resources, as well as geothermal energy potential.

UN reports affirm that Japan has the world's third largest geothermal resources. However, geothermal power accounts for less than 1% of total energy generated in Japan. The International Energy Agency (IEA) also estimates there is abundant power generation potential that can cover nine times the current electricity consumption of Japan.

Though Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishia announced at COP28 Japan's commitment to "strenuous efforts to meet the lofty goal of cutting emissions by 50%", there is much work to be done. In Japan's defence, it has set its 2030 greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction target at 46% from its 2013 levels, an ambitious goal aligned with its desire to hit carbon neutrality by 2050. How Japan cuts GHG is under tight scrutiny, however.

According to its Sixth Strategic Energy Plan, released in 2021, Japan considers coal an important energy source. Coal is the most carbon-intensive fossil fuel that can be burned, emitting hundreds of times more GHG than any other unit of energy. Japan plans to use coal as a stable and economical energy source while the country transitions to more renewable energies. In his COP28 debut speech, Kishida remarked that Japan's government would continue to prioritize the economy in its green transition "through various pathways that are compatible with economic growth". This mindset led Japan to unveil its controversial plan, Green Transformation Policy (GX) in early 2023, which is designed to foster energy sufficiency while phasing out carbon emissions.

GX will mobilize 150 trillion yen (US$1 trillion) in public and private financing in order to propel economic growth and secure stable energy supplies in the decarbonization process. In 2023, Kishida vowed to lead Asia through the transition to renewable energies and will ostensibly do so through pioneering this new energy generation method.

Criticism from academics, environmental activists, and citizens' groups alike have

argued that GX relies heavily on gas and fossil fuel-based technologies, such as carbon capture, usage, and storage (CCUS), ammonia, and hydrogen, rather than renewables. If developing countries in Asia adopt these technologies, it could prolong the life of coal and gas. Furthermore, many critics point out how ammonia and hydrogen are costly alternatives, arguing that investments should be channelled toward concrete renewable standards instead.

Renewable Energy Institute labels GX as a "Missed Opportunity", with other NGO organizations accusing it as greenwashing and misleading. French President Emmanuel Macron urged Japan to set a global standard as a G7 nation for renewable transitions. The GX policy is not the initiative the global arena called for, particularly after Japan's history of investments in Southeast Asia.

On average each year, Japan provided $10.6 billion for overseas gas, coal, and oil projects from 2018 to 2020. These investments helped Japan maintain certain political, diplomatic, and economic influence in Southeast Asia as these countries looked for ways to gain energy.

A direct example of this can be observed in Indonesia, Vietnam, and Bangladesh, where, until 2021, Japan has been involved in fossil fuel projects, including investments in the coal sector. Japan's government plans to phase out older, efficient coal power plants by 2030 and has committed to no longer funding overseas coal projects.

The urgency to curb average global temperatures from reaching 1.5 Celsius is reaching a critical point. Despite commitments on paper, Japan's methods may not be aligned with this goal and is therefore criticized for doing far too little in the fight against time to reduce GHG. The Japanese government is called upon to be at the forefront of worldwide and Southeast Asian sustainable developments, making their contributions important to monitor and evaluate.

5.

Tories

The journal takes an adventurous turn here,
introducing readers to a series of opinion pieces.
The first one explores the possibility of the Tories'
fall in the General Election leading to a change in
the way the British electoral system works.

Could the Collapse of the Tories Lead to the UK Implementing Proportional Representation?

KYLE JONES

As it has just turned 2024, and it being in most likelihood election year for the UK, it is perhaps a good time to start analysing the potential consequences of the likely Labour win in the General Election.

This election also has potential for being the firing pistol for the growth of smaller parties who could gain votes as the growth of dissatisfaction in British Politics continues to grow – this applying to the 'right' and potentially even the 'left' with Jeremy Corbyn tipped to launch a new rival social democratic party.[1] Many of these smaller parties believe in the abolition of First Past the Post (FPTP), as smaller parties very rarely gain seats but win a large number of votes. The question

lies potentially at the door of Reform UK and/or others (i.e Liberal Democrats) in how successful they could be and may lead the UK in changing its electoral system. If the Liberal Democrats et al do well, and Labour feel pressure from that growth, PR is a real possibility.

Firstly, it is worth a 'whistle stop tour' of the history of potential/proposed change to the electoral system and then look at why the status-quo is beneficial to the two major parties (Conservatives and Labour). Since the founding of the UK and the focus on greater representation in the 19th century, FPTP has always been the system at use in General Elections.[2] This began to be questioned when groups such

as the working-class, women, and minority groups, called for greater representation within Parliament. During the 19th century, during the Chartist movement which campaigned for working-class votes, two opposing proposals were drawn up by Tories and Liberals. Conservative MP Winthrop Mackworth Praed proposed the 'limited vote'.[3] This, in his belief, would prevent any one party from dominating in an election and ensure a voice (even if minor) was represented.

On the contrary, Liberal MP James Garth Marshall in 1853 proposed the 'Cumulative Vote'. In this system, members would have as many votes as there were seats and can distribute votes in any way they wanted.[4] This, as Klemperer notes, could lead to minorities placing all their votes on a candidate so some representation could be guaranteed. After this, the next proposal was seen as the most viable by many – 'personal representation' (now known as the Single Transferable Vote or STV for short). This was proposed in 1857 by the renowned political scientist Thomas Hare and his proposal was highly rated among Classical and, later, Modern Liberals alike. During John Stewart Mill's tenure as Liberal leader, he promoted changing the

UK electoral system to STV.[5]

However, no action would be taken as both the Liberals and the Tories (later Conservatives) benefited from the status-quo, a theme which transcends until today. The Liberals only raised concerns about proportionality when they were under threat by the growth of the Labour Party in the early 1900's. When devolution was initiated under New Labour, with the assistance of the Liberal Democrats under *the Cook-Maclennan Agreement*,[6] electoral reform was finally implemented in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland (AMS in Scotland and Wales, although in Wales this now has changed to first past the post).

These reforms have all been seen as a success which, in 2010 under the newly elected Lib-Con Coalition led to a referendum on a change to the electoral system used in General Elections. The proposed new method was the Alternative Vote (AV), this method sets electors to vote in preference, a candidate wins when they secure an 'absolute majority' (50%) is secured. [7]However, the turnout was low at 42% and it was a 67.9% majority for 'No'.[8]

This referendum poses one main

question, do people actually want PR or are myself and other actors in British politics posing an issue which many see as non-existent? According to YouGov, currently 45% of Britons want a new electoral system – this is not a 'true' simple majority (51%) yet.[9] However, smaller parties who promote the change are growing – two of note being the Liberal Democrats and Reform UK. These parties have made it a near manifesto mission to absorb defecting Tory voters and get them to vote for them instead – and it is working.

Since the fall of the short-lived Truss Administration, the Conservatives have been around 20 points below Labour with no sign of growth. This has led to many on the right to defect to the two stated parties; Reform going from 2% during Truss to 10% at present with the Liberal Democrats stabilising between 9 and 10% during the two premierships.[10] These two parties in their manifesto's make it explicit about their intention to introduce PR in General Elections.[12] It is near certain the Liberal Democrats will have seats but with Reform it may just become a similar situation to UKIP in 2015 where they were the third biggest party at 12.6% but won only one seat because of how FPTP functions.[13] This

is what many pollsters and analytical minds are currently predicting – for example *ElectoralCalculus* predicts Reform to gain zero seats but the Liberal Democrats to gain potentially 22.[13]

Despite this Reform can still play a key role in the Election – if they gain a notable amount of votes, Reform could be the reason why the Tories lose the election by a wide margin.[14] Another factor is if Jeremy Corbyn starts a party – a popular member among the social-democratic wing of Labour, he could split the labour vote. As Kier Starmer has condemned Corbyn and the 'Corbynite-wing' of Labour out of the party,[15] this could push reliance on the Liberal Democrats and Reform – thus allowing a grand opportunity for electoral reform. However, Corbyn is widely disliked by the general populous so a grand schism within Labour is highly unlikely – although younger members tend to fairly like Corbyn and Corbynism over Starmer/Blairite 'Third Way' politics.[16]

This election could be an interesting watch as there are many opportunities for change depending on how people and parties perform on polling day. The collapse of the Conservative Party is unquestionable

at current time, it is ultimately how smaller parties prepare and attack towards the election which could dictate proceedings. If Reform beats the pollsters and win seats, along with the Liberal Democrats gaining seats, PR is very much on the cards as two major parties in the Commons will actively call for it – putting pressure on the new Labour government. However, this looks unlikely because of the very thing they are calling to abolish – FPTP. In addition, would the two parties ever accept a change to a successful status-quo?

6

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Gaza

The second opinion piece, written by William Wylde, takes upon by no means a less engaging topic: the Israel–Palestine conflict. The author encourages readers to delve into the question of what can and should be done in Gaza, warning these are two very different questions.

Israel and Palestine: A realistic solution?

WILLIAM WYLDE

Palestine and Israel are perhaps unique in their relationship; two states that both claim the exact same territory, and whose opposition and animosity towards each other seems to nearly be a driving force for their existence. Two states that exist in a checkerboard formation, with enclaves and exclaves split off, or connected by fenced roads inaccessible to the other's transportation network. Many have tried to demarcate this land, and to divide the societies that exist within it along some form of boundary, be it religious, ethnic, or natural, and all who have done so have either failed, or not reached any form of satisfactory long-term conclusion.

Still others have attempted or petitioned

to wholly absorb one state or the other into their own, with radical members of the Knesset (the Israeli Parliament), clamouring for the annexation and settlement of the West Bank and Gaza, whilst fundamentalists in the Hamas movement, as well as in foreign states like Iran, call for the wholesale destruction of the state of Israel, with its people subject to either deportation or massacre in their ideal future.

With all these failed attempts at either integration or annexation one way or the other, the question is asked as to whether it is possible for Israel and Palestine to ever peacefully coexist, or if one power must eventually triumph over and defeat

Expectations vs Reality

The Israel–Palestine conflict is one that is likely to stir up many emotions in just as many people. Strong feelings persist on both sides of the debate, and these strong feelings inevitably give way to idealistic thinking, and a certain departure from reality insofar as expectations regarding possible future outcomes. To those who see Israel as an illegitimate colonial force oppressing innocent Palestinians, and thus call for Israel's disestablishment, I ask how, in the real world, do you see this coming to pass? Israel is one of the region's most advanced military powers and is all but confirmed to be in possession of nuclear weapons, as well as being supported by NATO states. It should be made clear, that there is no realistic chance of Israel ceasing to exist. On the other hand, to those on the Israeli side who call for the continued settlement of the West Bank and perhaps even Gaza, I ask how does Israel expect to contend with millions of dispossessed Palestinians with almost no stake in Israeli civil society? Israel cannot expect to maintain peaceful and stable control over

the other to secure regional stability?

Palestinian territory unless it drastically changes the way it treats Palestinian citizens, and if it does indeed do this, then it would need to evacuate settlements populated by hardline militant Israelis who form a powerful political bloc in the country. Israel is stuck between a proverbial rock and a hard place when it comes to the continued occupation of Palestinian territories. All of this is to say that, on one side or the other, simple and easy solutions do not readily present themselves.

What can be done?

Despite all of this, there are still possible solutions that could potentially be found. Firstly, there must be a guarantee of peace for both sides. This will most probably be impossible whilst Hamas still reigns in Gaza, as they are too ideologically opposed to the mere existence of Israel to negotiate, and many fighters will prefer to die as martyrs rather than surrender. The total military of Hamas at this point seems almost assured.

There are a number of possible outcomes that can follow from this. One fringe option would be the total dismantling of Gaza

entirely, with its people made refugees, most likely in Egypt. This idea has little support in any circles except those on the extreme Israeli right wing and would at once ruin the healthy working relationship that has been cultivated between Egypt and Israel over the past 40 years (as well as with the rest of the world), and so cannot be seen as realistically possible. Another option is Israel annexing Gaza and re-opening it to settlement. This option is also unlikely, as it would also provoke great international backlash and enrage Israel's Arab population, as well as likely provoking increased attacks from Hezbollah in Lebanon to the North, as well as other Arab states in the region.

A more realistic option would be for Israel to maintain military and security control of Gaza, whilst at the same time leaving civilian control in the hands of the Palestinians. This arrangement is comparable to large parts of the West Bank, and whilst certainly not ideal from the perspective of the Gazan people, it would perhaps be the most lenient approach that Israel is willing to accept. After Hamas is defeated, which due to overwhelming Israeli military supremacy they will certainly be, Israel will likely move in to

take security control of Gaza. Israel would probably be willing to allow non-Hamas Palestinians control of public institutions, but Israel will not trust Gaza with military control of the territory again, as to do so would be to leave themselves open to rocket fire, or even perhaps a repeat of the October 7th Massacre, which Hamas has vowed to carry out again if given the opportunity.

Finally, there are those who call for a single state solution where Israelis and Palestinians are treated as equals, and Palestinians are granted full Israeli citizenship under a reformed Israeli state and constitution. This is perhaps the ideal outcome, and would, if successful, be a shining example of peace and cooperation. There is historical precedent for societies that were previously exclusionary adopting integrationist policies, such as South Africa, however the success of this example is debatable. At this point, it is arguably unrealistic to hope for a completely equitable resolution to this conflict due to the sheer amount of vitriol that persists on both sides, and any resolution is all but guaranteed to be skewed in Israel's favour. The only real question that remains is how skewed this settlement will be. Throughout all of this debate and discussion, it must

be acknowledged that, for both sides, this conflict has been nothing short of a humanitarian nightmare. Casualty numbers for the Gaza war stretch into the tens of thousands, and all possible efforts to mitigate the impact of the war on the Gazan people, as well as preventing a repeat of October 7th, must be considered.

What should be done?

The question of what is morally right is a very murky one, as both sides have highly convincing arguments for their own legitimacy. The Palestinians have lived on the land for generations and have made their homes there. It must understandably be rather galling for them to hear Israeli arguments about their ancient biblical right to the territory when they have inhabited the region for centuries. On the other hand, the Israeli argument is equally strong. Jews have lived in Israel continuously for over 4000 years, and given the history of global antisemitism, some have made the argument that a Jewish state is a necessity for the safety of the Jewish people. What's more, is the simple fact that Israel has claimed, conquered, and settled the territory. In the eyes of many, this grants them the right to it. After all, possession is reputedly nine tenths of the law. In the world of international politics, is there any right and wrong, or just competing arguments of genuinely equal sincerity? Both sides have forceful claims to the land, and this is one of the key complicating factors in the search for a solution to the Israeli/Palestinian dispute: How do compromise between two equally valid, yet diametrically opposing points of view?

7
Refugees

Here, we would like to introduce readers to the last opinion piece. The subject at hand is asylum seekers. The author questions the pilot scheme that the British government has been employing and provides an alternative system based on recipient communities.

Alternatives to Detention for Asylum Seekers: Surveillance and Community-based Systems

MATILDA FALCHETTA

Asylum seekers, often facing no option but to arrive via dangerous and illegal routes, tend to be scapegoated and marginalised within host states. As such, they are often treated as potential threats to peace and stability and could be denied their freedom in detention centres. Those subject to detention may live in unsafe conditions, have limited access to legal aid, and be retraumatized by their experiences there. There is thus an urgent need to find alternatives. However, which alternative systems to use is greatly disputed, with many states increasingly tending towards surveillance-based systems, which often continue to risk asylum seekers' human rights. This essay will discuss the option of surveillance-based systems with a particular focus on the UK use of Electronic Monitoring, as well as introducing the idea of community-based alternatives to detention.

UK GPS trackers

Within the UK, foreign offenders and those under immigration control may be subject to GPS tracking, meaning they are forced to wear a GPS tag. A current pilot scheme is seeking to also introduce this system for any asylum seeker arriving via "unnecessary and dangerous routes".[1] This is often presented as an alternative to detention. However, it continues to subject asylum seekers to rights violations

and government control, thus denying them their liberty.

The use of tags impacts on every minute detail of an asylum seeker's life; causing them to feel unable to go out in public due to stigma, develop mental health issues at higher levels, suffer from physical pain and face barriers to their roles as parents.[2] Furthermore, asylum seekers may be forced to restructure their time around the fact that they will need to be connected to a charging port for about two hours to charge. The GPS may also misplace them, showing them to be at different locations to where they actually are, potentially putting them in violation of government restrictions such as curfews, and causing issues for their asylum applications.[3]

As well as impacting asylum seekers' everyday lives, their human right to privacy can be violated. GPS tags monitor migrants' location 24 hours a day, generating trail data which is stored for 6 years.[4] Data created is not subject to proper safeguarding and may be used in ways detrimental to the migrant. One justification for the use of GPS tagging is that it encourages compliance with immigration rules and ensures there is no absconding,[6] without the use of detention.

As such data can be used to track migrants who may have absconded, or check they are complying with bail conditions. However, studies have shown that UK levels of absconsion are extremely low, rendering this invasive monitoring unnecessary.[6]

Data is also commonly used in analysing the legitimacy of an article 8 representation, which relies on a migrant proving that they are embedded within UK society, usually meaning they have family members here, in order to gain asylum.[7] One migrant explained how his trail data was used to assess the closeness of his relationship with his son, and thus determine whether he should be deported.[8] This goes beyond the scope of public protection, instead utilising the private details of people's lives and relationships to critically analyse their legal rights, thus interfering with the "home, family and private lives" of migrants.[9]

Ultimately, the use of Electronic Monitoring, far from giving asylum seekers liberty, is a form of e-carceration, costing them their private lives, and often mental health. This sort of extreme surveillance and state control over migrants' lives contributes to the marginalisation and

isolation of migrants within society, as they are increasingly associated with criminals.

Community Based Alternatives

The use of surveillance is often seen as the only viable alternative to detention. However, community-based alternatives, providing a holistic approach to meeting the needs of asylum seekers can prove to be effective, more cost efficient and humane. These systems provide NGOs and community-based groups with resources necessary to respond to asylum seekers basic needs, accommodation and legal support.[10]

In Spain a community-based case management program was enacted for a time during the Covid-19 pandemic when they let asylum seekers outside of detention for their safety. The Fundación Cepaim, an organisation operating centres in Spain provided asylum seekers with accommodation, legal assistance, classes to help with integration into Spanish society, and other general necessities. Despite the continued trial of living without documentation, those impacted by this scheme reported feeling supported and safe.[11]

One of the principle uses and justifications for a surveillance based system is that it encourages compliance with court proceedings and legal requirements. However, not only are absconsion rates usually very low regardless, community management programs have proven to encourage compliance, especially since they provide asylum seekers with better legal support, helping them better understand how to comply with proceedings. In community pilot schemes used in Bulgaria, Cyprus, and Poland 86% of participants remained engaged with immigration procedures.[12] Whilst in the US based family case management pilot program 99% complied with ICE checkups and 100% were present at court hearings, demonstrating the low levels of non-compliance, even without the detriment created by surveillance.[13]

Finally, costs of case management programs are lower than those needed to keep people in detention. In the US for instance, it cost on average $143.92 per day to keep an individual in detention in 2020, however the pilot Family Case Management Program cost only $38 per family per day.[14]

This will also be lower than the costs associated with electronic monitoring.

Conclusions

Creating an alternative to detention is an imperative to protect the rights of asylum seekers in host states. However, the growing use of surveillance technologies such as electronic monitoring used in the UK create not an alternative to detention but a new form of "e-carceration", which continues to deprive asylum seekers of their liberty, as they are forced to structure their lives around monitors and surveillance, leaving them isolated and ostracised from society.[15] An alternative in the form of community-based management is possible, as has been demonstrated in trials throughout the world, however most states remain reluctant to take this route. Ultimately, the worrying trend towards increased surveillance of migrants, which can be seen globally, does not in my view offer a true solution to detention. Instead, it sets the precedent for privacy rights being seen as a luxury which governments can choose not to grant to undocumented migrants and asylum seekers.

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Navy

The last article for this issue is an essay written by Daniel Garner, a master's student at the Department of International Politics. As the issue runs to its end, readers might raise their gaze upon the sea, where the author unfolds his view on the naval doctrine in the 21st century.

Evolving Naval Doctrine
for 21st Century Naval Warfare

DANIEL GARNER

In the 20th Century, a navy was paramount to a state's ability to create and protect an overseas empire, and thus the Great Powers of the time sought to build gargantuan fleets, focusing heavily on prestigious battleships and the idea of a Mahanian victory to achieve its maritime strategy. By the turn of the 21st Century, this strategy had completely disappeared, trading battleships for aircraft carriers and Mahanian victory for small skirmishes and clashes. Despite this, a state's need for a navy remains as crucial today as it did one hundred years prior, with even the Middle Powers now putting a greater emphasis on a navy compared to the Middle Powers of the 19th and 20th Centuries. The primary reason for this is the ability that

a navy plays in demonstrating a nation's sovereignty and independence, allowing for even the smallest of nations to stand in opposition to its global rivals and ensuring their connection to their sealines of communication.[1] This is best seen in states such as Iceland, whose clashes with the Royal Navy in the 20th Century forced the Major Powers of the time to respect its wishes and helped to solidify Icelandic national identity on the international stage. Secondly, a key role of a navy in the 21st Century is that of 'power' and 'threat' projection, allowing the Major Powers to project their will upon foreign states via the stationing and posturing of their navy and subsequently allowing Middle Powers to threaten the status quo of the

region, thus giving a voice and legitimacy for their own international objectives.[2] As a result of this, despite the fact that maintaining a sizeable navy is one of the most strategically important actions any modern state can do in the 21st Century, the strategy behind each of states' navy and its objectives remain varying and often opposing. To understand the strategic importance behind modern navies, it is first key to understanding the different missions and strategies employed by the different powers.

Firstly, the naval strategy and role of the Major Powers fleet can vary from state to state; however, they do retain a level of consistency between them. This comes most notably in the form of anti-piracy operations, which almost all Major Powers participate in, including those who are international rivals or those actively engaged in war, i.e., the United States and China, and Russia and Ukraine, respectively. The global effort to protect maritime trade not only ensures the continued safety of international shipping routes,[3] and thus by extension, the economies of these Major Powers, but also acts as a blanket deterrence and counter to the naval objectives of some of the Middle and

Small Powers, meaning that although, for example, nominally Chinese aligned states are being countered, i.e., Iran and Yemen, nominally US aligned states are also being countered, i.e., Malaysia and Egypt.

Whilst not completely successful, this global effort is paramount to a state's ascension to a Middle Power status, allowing those who should be seen as a Small Power, such as New Zealand, to actively participate on the international stage, thus elevating its overall diplomatic power.

The second key role of a Major Power's maritime strategy is that of power projection,[4] the idea that the mere presence or existence of a state's navy is an influence on other states' domestic and international actions. Whilst this role has been slowly shrinking over the past twenty years, especially with the decline of American hegemony post 9/11, it still remains one of the strategically useful roles that modern navies fill, allowing even some of the weaker Major Powers, such as the UK and France to push their own international agendas, seen in regions such as West Africa and the Middle East. The role of power projection is best demonstrated

by the United States, as its colossal ship numbers allow it to simultaneously project to a multitude of regions across the globe, deterring enemies and allies alike.

This follows neatly into the third role that a modern navy fills, which is that of being allied protection, as, just with the aforementioned ability to project sovereignty, an allied fleet can also function as a sovereignty projector. This can be seen across many areas of the globe, with states such as the Philippines and Taiwan benefiting greatly from the presence of US Fleets and Battlegroups. This role is amplified to the extreme with organisations such as NATO and BRICS allowing for the combination and deployment of a number of allied nation's fleet, greatly projecting even the smallest nations sovereignty onto the global stage.[5] This has also allowed Small and Middle Powers to be elevated to Middle and Major Powers, such as seen with the Finish ascension into NATO in 2023.

In comparison, the naval strategy and role of a Middle Powers act in almost stark contrast to that of a Major Power, focusing more on protecting and displaying its own sovereignty, demonstrating its own power within the region, and crucially being a

vessel for allied Major Powers to project their own power through.

Firstly, a Middle Powers' navy acts as states' display of sovereignty,[6] in a similar way to the aforementioned Major Powers allied projection, allowing a regional power to counter a rival's claims and ensure its own maritime borders and maritime trade access.[7] This is best demonstrated by their being all but 44 of the 193 UN member states with direct access to the sea, a vast majority of which maintain some form of navy or coast guard,[8] with a majority of landlocked states having either conditional access to the sea via treaties or having claims on neighbouring states coastlines, i.e., Hungary (a technically former naval power) via the EU or Ethiopia and its conflict in Tigray. This means that having a powerful navy relative to your state allows many states to interact unrestricted on the international stage, forcing other states to recognise or be unable to ignore another state's sovereignty.[9]

The best and most contemporary display of this is found in the 2022 war in Ukraine, where in the opening months the war looked to be against Ukraine, especially with the near total destruction of the Ukrainian navy

by the Russian Black Sea Fleet. However, following the sinking of the Moskva and the re-establishing of control over areas of the Ukrainian Black Sea, the reconnection of maritime supply into Ukraine helped to reaffirm Ukraine's national sovereignty to the world, at least in terms of in the minds of people.

Secondly, the naval strategy of the Middle Powers allows them to stand as a threat to international maritime trade,[10] with a multitude of states actively partaking in seizing international shipping, mostly in the form of oil vessels. Even states who find themselves in disarray can project themselves onto the global stage via this strategy, i.e., Somalia. And its history of piracy. This also feeds into the third role of the Middle Powers' navy, that is, in a symbiotic way to that of a Major Power, the ability to 'piggyback' off of another state's power projection. The Middle Powers of NATO, for example, are thus able to project well above what they should outside of NATO.[11]

States also benefit from the balance that it brings to a region, such as Greece and Turkey, which cannot outmatch each other in terms of naval power as the other members of NATO function as a counterbalance, ensuring, for the meantime, peace between the regional rivals. This is not unique to NATO though, as other states, such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, also benefit from a form of this, seeing American and Chinese Fleets as counterbalances in the region.

Having established how Major and Middle Powers utilise navy power, and by extension why a strong navy is strategically important to them, it is proper to theorise, using this as a basis, to the potential future that navies have going further into the 21st Century. Firstly, with the rise of China on the international stage and return to a bi or even multi-polar international system, the role of a navy becomes even more critical, as a 'Pax Americana' is no longer a guaranteed.[12] The first signs of this have been the reduction of the US from its international commitments, coinciding with the rise of America First policies and nominally anti-US policies from some of its allied Major Powers. This has put a greater emphasis on states being able to protect themselves or at least project their own sovereignty without US assistance, notably in the former Great Powers of Europe and of its nominal protectorates in the Middle East.[13]

Secondly, the outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine War, the ongoing conflict in Israel and the potential for another conflict in the Middle East has demonstrated a failure of American power projection, something that also positively feeds into and coincides with the naval rearmament of China. With the constant rapid evolution of technology, the future of naval warfare is also likely to change, potentially seeing a return to Mahanian style strategies by the Major Powers, due to the minuscule differences and advantages between Anti-Ship Missiles (ASM) and the systems designed to counter them.[14]

This, however, would spell the opposite for a Middle Power, as a large battle fleet would not be financially possible thus causing a doubling down of the current doctrine, which being smaller skirmish style engagements and displays of force, putting a greater focus on ASMs and hit-and-run tactics .[15] This thus feeds into the already existing issue of piracy and potential commerce raiding, as smaller vessels and more cost-effective ASMs lean heavily into these tactics as a successful way for a Middle Power to close the gap between either the current naval strategies or a potential return to Mahanian thinking,

in a similar way to the late to the interwar German thinking of the 1910's and 20's, via the use of submarines.[16] To best prove this hypothesis, examining a case study from each of powers - a Major and Middle Power, would best explain the current and future strategic importance of a strong naval force.

Firstly, for the Major Power case study, whilst it would be easy to examine the United States, their position as the current hegemon and the higher potential for a return to Mahanian thinking, due to China, means that they fail as a current understanding and a more accurate test of the hypothesis. As such, it is better to examine Russia, as it is currently involved in a war, has a history of naval ambition, and is likely to be in the most evolving geo-strategic position over the course of the 21st Century. The role of the Russian navy, as of the moment, is split into three parts; first, the surface fleet, primarily the Black Sea Fleet, who's ongoing deployment puts them into direct combat with the Ukrainian Fleet and Ukrainian ASMs. The other Russian Fleets operate as a way for Russia to deter and project power across the Baltic Sea and the Artic Circle, seeing a large deployment of submarines, both

conventional and nuclear.[17]

As a result of this, and the undecided outcome of the War in Ukraine, the future of Russian naval strategy is unclear, with a potential return to late Soviet era thinking being due to the current global doctrine and the current cost to effectiveness ratio of naval vessels.[18] This is only further reinforced by the aforementioned sinking of the Moskva, demonstrating a need to increase the size of the current Russian navy, at least in the Black Sea, if for nothing else to project Russian power into Turkey, allowing for the reopening of the Dardanelles, closed following the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian War,[19] allowed un the 1936 Montreux Convention. However, due to climate change, the melting ice and rising temperatures of Russia's nominally cold-water ports in the North,[20] could allow Russia to field a much larger surface fleet as well as opening up new maritime trade and resource regions for Russia to project into. Furthermore, this would allow Russia to field a larger fleet as a whole and as such would allow Russia to re-enter the naval global stage, something that, in conjunction with its Chinese allies, would allow for a greater power projection against the US and its allies, notably the Baltic and

Scandinavian states, as well as allowing for a larger deployment range of the current Russian navy.

This, with or without the securing of the warm-water ports along the Ukrainian Black Sea coast, would give greater access to Russian-aligned ports and thus allow Russian allies to also make use of an increased naval range, most likely China, who could posture themselves closer to the US, removing the current US advantage of distance.[21] This subsequently means that, going forward, a strong navy would be even more paramount for Russia, necessitating a new naval build-up and more than likely more conflicts to secure more ports in the future.

For the Middle Power case study, whilst it would be easy to choose a NATO-aligned state, it is better to approach it from an anti-US state, as those would be the most likely to benefit from changes to the current naval importance. As such, the state of Iran best serves this as they are currently in the crosshairs of the US due to their power projection into the Middle East, specifically against current US allies such as Iraq and Saudi Arabia, as well as their ongoing support for anti-US organisations across

the globe, such as Hamas, the Houthi rebels of Yemen and a multitude of Syrian rebels.

Iranian ambition in the Middle East has led them to be one of the number one threats to the current US ambition in the region.[22] Seeing states on each side of the country occupied by the US over the past twenty years, the Iranian state seeks to control the flow of oil from the Gulf to the West. It has undertaken a multitude of seizure of vessels, mainly oil tankers, over the past few years, swelling tensions in the region and actively threatening American control.[23]

It also demonstrates the power that a Middle Powers navy has when utilised effectively, allowing Iran to bring the US and its allies to the negotiating table and acting as a deterrence to ignoring Iranian wishes. The Iranian navy has also been theorised in US war games to pose a substantial threat to the US navy, utilising the many smaller crafts that it possesses to threaten the security and safety of the mighty US carriers, something that would all but cripple current US naval doctrine.[24]

As a result of this, Iran has been able to fulfill all of the naval strategies and roles of a Middle Power, threatening Major Power

influence in their region, demonstrating their sovereignty on the international stage and allowing other Major Powers to project through the, notably China and Russia.[25]

Thus, it would not be wrong to assume that going forward, it would be likely that an increase in cooperation with the aforementioned Major Powers would occur, allowing for even greater reduction in US influence, whilst simultaneously allowing Iran to, like the aforementioned NATO states, 'piggyback' off of Chinese and potentially Russian naval power to project itself further into Middle Eastern affairs. Despite this, unlike Major Powers, it is unlikely that Iran would potentially adopt a Mahanian doctrine[26] as its current doctrine would prove to be more than effective to any Major Power's going forward, but it is still likely that Iran would increase the strength, if not the size, of its current fleet.[27] Utilising the advancements made in ASMs and stealth technology, the Iranian fleet would likely be a formidable force within the Middle East, potentially allowing it to rise up to a regional Major Power.

As can be seen from these case studies and the afore assessments of the current

naval strategy and roles of Middle and Major Powers, it is easy to assume that, currently, a strong navy is strategically critical to states in the 21st Century. Going forward, the role of navies, regardless of how they change, is more than likely to increase in strategic importance, as globalisation increases so does the reliance on maritime trade and sea travel,[28] forcing states to once again return to a position seen by the Great Powers of the 20th Century, necessitating a fleet to ensure ones own and ones allies' maritime protection, force projection and sovereignty.[29]

This would in turn put a greater prestige value onto a state's navy, in a similar way to the Age of Battleship and the prestige that came with them, but now in the form of a state's ability to project along the lines of naval communication.[30] This all culminates in the return to a multipolar world and an age shaped by climate change, where new sea lanes are opened and a guaranteed 'Pax Americana' is no longer possible, forcing states to once again, either seek protection by other Major Powers, in a way akin to the Empires of Europe in the 19th and 20th Centuries, or to stand on their own and scale up the strength of their navy, through either size or technological advancements.

Regardless of the future, the fact still remains that a strong naval force, just as it had been for centuries prior, is still of the upmost strategic importance for any sovereign state in the 21st Century.

Endnotes

LOST IN TRANSLATION

1. *The Bible In Basic English.* (Cambridge, Cambridge Press, 1965), p. 10.

2. Wertenbaker, T. 'Scene 16', in *The Love of the Nightingale*, edited by Timberlake Wertenbaker (London, Faber and Faber, 1996), p. 337.

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MIGRANT CONTRIBUTIONS AND CLIMATE JUSTICE: A CALL FOR INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE FACE OF RISING CLIMATE MIGRATION

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