

## **Proposed Changes to USS – Myths, Misconceptions and Misunderstandings**

Many of the comments and claims that have been made against the case for necessary reform are based on misunderstanding or misinterpretation of the facts. Here we address some of the more common myths, misconceptions and misunderstandings (Ms).

This document has been updated on 7<sup>th</sup> November to include additional facts (M9 to M18) and a link to a further explanation by USS of its valuation assumptions (added to M7).

### **M1: Benefits will not apply above £40,000**

Members will continue to build up pension benefits on all of their pay.

Under the employers' proposals for reform, all members of USS will continue to receive defined benefits on salary up to a threshold. The employer representatives currently propose to set this salary threshold at £50,000, which would mean that around two thirds of current members would receive Career Revalued Benefits (CRB) on their whole salary. The vast majority of current members will receive a high proportion of their pension from the CRB section.

Benefits on earnings above the proposed salary threshold of £50,000 will be provided in a new Defined Contribution (DC) section. The contribution rate proposed for the USS DC section is generous compared to the UK average with a total of 18.5% of earnings above the salary threshold going directly into each member's pension pot (12% from the employer and 6.5% from the member). In addition members will have the option to contribute an additional 1% which will be matched by their employer. The ONS Occupational Pension Schemes Survey 2013 states that the average total contribution to private sector UK DC schemes is just 9%\* (6.1% employer and 2.9% member).

A salary threshold of £50,000 is subject to the USS Trustees (and the Pensions Regulator) agreeing to an extension of the period over which the current deficit is to be repaid.

### **M2: Everyone will get lower benefits**

Existing members of the CRB section of the USS will see no difference in their benefits unless their pay rises above the proposed salary threshold of £50,000 (currently fewer than a third of members would be affected by a salary threshold at

this level). In fact, members who take advantage of the option to pay 1% of their salary into the new DC section would accrue additional benefits with this contribution matched by the employer.

For members currently in the final salary section of USS (who will change to CRB for future benefits), the impact of the proposed changes will very much depend on their individual circumstances. All members with salary above the proposed threshold will build up additional benefits in the DC section of the USS. The changes announced in the March 2014 Budget mean that such members may benefit from being able to take more of their pension as cash and will have significantly greater flexibility as to how and when they take this portion of their benefits.

### **M3: Employers will pay less under the proposed reforms**

The employers will actually pay more under the proposed reforms.

The employers are prepared to increase their overall contribution to USS from 16% to 18% of total salary to help ensure the USS remains sustainable and benefits remain attractive. This additional investment is approximately £135m a year and follows an increase in employer contributions from 14% to 16% in 2009.

The overall contribution is made up of contributions to the CRB section, 12% contributions plus the optional 1% matching contribution to the DC section and deficit reduction payments.

### **M4: The pre-92 universities are doing well and can afford to pay more than 18% in to the USS**

The proposed changes are designed to create a structure for USS which is sustainable and affordable over the long term – for both employers and members. The increase in the employers' contribution from 16% to 18% is a very significant cost to the sector, approximately £135m a year.

The consultation with employers made it clear that contributions above 18% were unaffordable as this could impact on other investments in staff, student facilities and research.

A key objective is to address the USS's sizeable and volatile funding deficit and to achieve this it is essential to move to a position where the rate at which the liabilities grow is more predictable. Simply paying more money into the USS without bringing the defined benefit liabilities under control will fail to address either the deficit or the risk that contributions for USS members and employers alike, may otherwise rise to unsustainable levels.

### **M5: USS enjoys positive cash flow so the reforms are unnecessary**

While it is true that in the last financial year the USS's income – contributions and investment returns – exceeded its outgoings it is not enough for a pension scheme simply to cover its outgoings on a year by year basis. Rather, like all funded UK pension schemes, USS is required to meet its 'statutory funding objective', that is, to have sufficient assets to meet its liability to pay benefits already built up in the scheme. For some years now, the USS has had a sizeable and persistent, yet volatile, deficit on this basis. Not only is it desirable to take steps to eliminate this deficit, the trustees are required by law to put in place a plan to do so and their plan must meet the requirements of the Pensions Regulator.

The USS is becoming increasingly 'mature'; pensioners are living longer and the ratio of pensioners to active members is increasing. So, while the USS may be cash flow positive at the moment that will not always be the case. The most significant and fastest increasing liabilities are associated with the final salary section of the USS which is why it is necessary to close this section to bring costs under control. In March 2013, the USS was in deficit by £11.5 billion.

### **M6: The proposed changes are politically motivated to prepare the HE sector for privatisation**

The proposed reforms are not politically motivated. They are designed to address the continuing funding deficit while providing attractive benefits that are sustainable and affordable over the long term. The employers recognise that a good pension scheme helps to attract and retain the calibre of staff needed to maintain the UK HE sector's global reputation for excellence. Unfortunately, the current level of USS benefits is unaffordable over the long term and to continue to support it unreformed would result in funds being diverted away from core university activities and probable staffing cuts.

### **M7: The assumptions used to value the fund have been chosen to artificially create a large deficit**

Valuing a pension scheme is an inexact science, as it is necessary to make predictions about future events, such as salary increases, life expectancy and investment returns. This is the job of the USS Trustees and, with the help of their professional advisors, they have modelled a wide range of possible outcomes, always bearing in mind that they are required to act prudently. While the Trustees changing the assumptions in this instant could affect the size of the deficit, it cannot change a deficit into a surplus. The deficit is sizeable and persistent and benefit reform is unavoidable, and expected by the Pensions Regulator.

The USS has made available an explanation of its assumptions online at:  
<http://www.uss.co.uk/SCHEMEGUIDE/FUNDING/Pages/default.aspx>

### **M8: The changes will lead to a two-tier pension system at UK universities**

The two main schemes for academic staff - USS and the Teacher's Pension Scheme (TPS) – have always offered different benefit scales and already have different employee contribution levels. Like USS, the TPS final salary structure has become unaffordable; to bring costs under control the TPS is moving to a CRB structure for all members with effect from next April.

But there are more differences than similarities between the schemes. Unlike the USS, the TPS is unfunded and operates on a pay-as-you-go basis, whereby pensions are paid from current contribution income. Being a public sector scheme, TPS is backed by the Government so any difference between the contributions coming in and the pensions going out can be picked up by HM Treasury and ultimately, the taxpayer.

In addition, TPS members pay more towards their pension; the average employee contribution is 9.6%, but contributions are tiered based on the member's salary and range from 6.4% to 12.4%. The proposed member contribution to the reformed USS is 6.5% for all members.

The current USS scheme costs 23.4% of salaries and, without reform, this will continue to increase. Moving to a TPS equivalent scheme would require an overall contribution level of 43.9% which would be unaffordable for employers and employees.

### **M9: The employers' proposals have been presented as a 'fait accompli' rather than considering different options**

In preparing the proposals currently under negotiation, the employers considered, modelled and costed a wide range of different options. The proposed reforms represent the best package of pension benefits among the options considered, retaining a defined benefit structure for the highest proportion of members, while remaining within the affordability constraints.

### **M10: Further *independent* modelling should be done so USS members can be confident of the information being provided.**

The modelling provided to members to show potential benefits under the proposed changes has been developed by USS using assumptions about future salary progression and investment returns that were jointly agreed in discussions between UCU and the employer representatives at the USS Funding and Benefits Sub Committee. Independent modelling using the same assumptions should produce the same answers; modelling using different assumptions would produce different answers, but these would not be consistent with the way the USS trustees are required to value the scheme.

The employers have asked USS to model further examples to illustrate what the reforms might mean for members.

**M11: Those institutions with a large number of higher paid staff will pay less than others under the proposed reforms.**

All employers would pay the same rate, increasing their contribution from 16% to 18% of total salaries. The misunderstanding has arisen because the employer contribution which would be paid into the proposed defined contribution section, which will provide benefits in respect of salaries above salary threshold of £50,000, is 12%, rather than 18%. The balance of the employer contribution will pay for future benefits in the career revalued benefits section and will be required to address the scheme's funding deficit in respect of past service benefits.

**M12: For longer-standing members of the pension scheme, final salary benefits are facing the axe.**

Existing final salary benefits would be protected at the point of change, calculated on pensionable salary and service at that date and increased each year in line with the CPI. All members would build up future defined benefits in the career revalued benefits section on their salary up to the salary threshold of £50,000 and in the defined contribution section on their salary above that threshold.

**M13: Newer members face the prospect of their retirement benefits being slashed, with the newest facing the worst pensions of all.**

The reality is that any new members earning less than £50,000 would receive the same benefits as they would if they joined the scheme today. In fact they would be better off if they chose to pay an additional 1% DC contribution which would be matched by their employer. The significant DC employer contribution above £50,000 means that in many cases even higher earning new members should enjoy broadly the same level of benefits as under the current arrangement, with some members likely to be better off in the reformed scheme.

It is also worth remembering that the £50,000 salary threshold would be increased each year in line with an index to be agreed (such as CPI).

**M14: These changes are an unnecessary assault on our pensions.**

Reform of the USS benefit structure is both necessary and urgent. Unless reforms can be agreed before June 2015, the USS trustees will have no choice but to increase contributions to a level that is unsustainable for members (c12%) and employers (c25%) alike. After that, the conversations would not just be about 'how

can we change the scheme?’ but ‘where can we make cuts (most likely in staffing) to meet the additional costs of USS?’ or even ‘how much longer can USS survive?’ In addition, it is highly likely that the trustees would need to impose further contribution increases following future fund valuations.

**M15: The normal funding rules should not apply to USS as the university employers could always bail out the scheme.**

The USS is a private occupational pension scheme and as such falls under the remit of the Pensions Regulator. It has to meet certain minimum levels of funding, a test which, using the most recent assumptions proposed by USS, it fails to the tune of around £12.3 billion as at 31 March 2014. Accordingly the USS trustees *must* agree a ‘recovery plan’ to remove the deficit over a reasonable period. If the stakeholders fail to agree on reforms, the trustees will be compelled to increase contributions to a level that would be unsustainable for members (at 12%) and employers (at 25%) alike.

**M16: The examples given by UUK are misleading because they assume no promotion or incremental salary increases**

The modelling provided to members to show potential benefits under the proposed changes has been calculated by USS using assumptions about future salary progression and investment returns that were jointly agreed in discussions between UCU and the employers. USS has been asked to prepare additional modelling to show the potential implications of the proposed changes on other member profiles. This will be made public as soon as it is available.

**M17: The assumptions made about life expectancy are flawed.**

It was brought to the attention of the Employers Pensions Forum (EPF) that a Q&A relating to longevity contained information that required clarification. The intention behind the Q&A was simply to describe general improvements in longevity in the UK, however due to a drafting error the Q&A read as if it was describing improvements in life expectancy specifically for USS members. This has now been removed from the EPF website. The full set of Q&As can be accessed by everyone at [www.employerspensionsforum.co.uk/en/EPF-News/news.cfm/20may14](http://www.employerspensionsforum.co.uk/en/EPF-News/news.cfm/20may14).

For USS members, the most meaningful data on increasing longevity will probably be that drawn from actual experience of the scheme. Indeed it is this data that USS uses in assessing the scheme’s funding position and future contribution requirements. The EPF has therefore requested data on longevity changes from SS and this information will be uploaded once this is received.

**M18: The employers can afford to pay more.**

The HE sector continues to face considerable uncertainty and financial insecurity; sustainability remains pivotal as HEIs make on-going adjustments to working within the new funding regimes.

If employer contributions increase to the proposed 18%, the amount paid by employers to support the USS will have increased by 4% of pay since 2009. Employers also face a 2-2.5% increase in National Insurance contributions from 2016 as a result of the end of contracting out.

Contributions above this level would be unaffordable for most institutions over anything but the very short term. HEIs might find it necessary to dip into their reserves, money which is needed to invest in capital projects, such as student facilities, buildings maintenance and updating of IT systems in order to continue to compete in the global education market.